

Public-key Cryptography and elliptic curves

Dan Nichols
nichols@math.umass.edu

University of Massachusetts

Oct. 14, 2015

Cryptography is the study of secure communications. Here are some important terms:

- Alice wants to send a message (called the **plaintext**) to Bob.
- To make sure only the Bob can understand the message, she **encrypts** it, transforming the plaintext into the **ciphertext**
- Bob can **decrypt** the ciphertext and reveal the plaintext, but other people cannot.
- A **cipher** is an algorithm for performing encryption and/or decryption

- In a **symmetric cipher**, the same **key** is used for both encryption and decryption.
- Alice and Bob must both share the same key, and make sure no one else has access to it.
- This is difficult – how do they exchange keys securely?

Symmetric cryptography

- Analogy: a locked safe. Both Alice and Bob have copies of the key to open it. Each can leave messages there for the other to find.



Here's a cipher used by Julius Caesar: to encrypt a message, shift each letter of the alphabet forward by N letters.

- if $N = 3$, replace every letter with the letter three steps after it in the alphabet.
 - $a \rightarrow d, b \rightarrow e$, etc.
 - 'cipher' \rightarrow 'flskhu'
- Decrypt by shifting each letter back N steps
- The secret key is N

Why is this cipher so easy to break?

- The **key space** (number of possible keys) is small: only **26** possible keys
 - You could easily break this cipher with a **brute force attack**: try every key until you find the right one.
- The cipher does not hide all the statistical properties of the message
 - Check the frequency in which each letter appears. Compare to the known frequencies of letters in English text. This is an example of an **analytic attack**.

- Today we have much stronger symmetric ciphers available such as **AES** (Advanced Encryption Standard)
 - Huge key space – brute force attacks are effectively impossible
 - Carefully designed to prevent analytic attacks
- But all symmetric ciphers, no matter how strong, share some of the same inherent weaknesses:
 - Both parties must first communicate securely to share a secret key, which requires an already secure channel.
 - In a network of people, each pair (e.g. Alice, Bob) needs its own shared key.
 - With N people, that's $N(N - 1)/2$ keys in total.

- **Public-key cryptography** (or **asymmetric cryptography**) solves these problems
- Basic idea: instead of Alice and Bob sharing a secret key, each person has their own **public key** and their own **private key**
- Invented* in 1976 by Whitfield Diffie, Martin Hellman, and Ralph Merkle
 - Invented years earlier by GCHQ (and probably NSA), but not revealed to the public.

Public-key cryptography outline:

- 1 Bob generates both a public key and a private key.
 - He makes his public key visible to everyone but keeps his private key secret
- 2 Alice encrypts a message using Bob's public key, and sends it to Bob
- 3 Bob can decrypt the message using his private key

So anyone who wants to send Bob an encrypted message can do so using Bob's **public key**. But decrypting these messages requires Bob's **private key**, which only Bob has!

- No secure channel necessary. Alice can send Bob a message without them sharing the same secret key.
- In a network, each person just needs their own public key and private key.
 - In a network of N people, this is N public keys and N private keys in total.

Public-key cryptography

- Analogy: each person has their own locked mailbox with a slot to accept incoming messages



How are public-key algorithms used?

- In practice, public-key cryptosystems are much slower and less efficient compared to symmetric ciphers. Not a good way to send large messages quickly.
- These days secure communication usually works like this:
 - Use a public-key protocol to securely exchange symmetric keys for a fast symmetric cipher such as AES.
 - Then we use this symmetric cipher to actually exchange messages.
 - Best of both worlds!

How are public-key algorithms constructed?

- Based on mathematical **trapdoor functions**: easy computations that are hard to reverse.
 - More technically: a one-to-one function f where it's easy to compute $y = f(x)$ but hard to compute $x = f^{-1}(y)$.
- Example: **RSA** (Rivest, Shamir, Adelman) is based on the problem of factoring a huge integer into a product of prime numbers
 - If you have two large prime numbers, it's easy to multiply them together
 - But if you have a huge number that you know is the product of two primes, it is very hard to find out what those primes are!
- Another trapdoor is the discrete logarithm problem

- One fairly simple public-key scheme is **Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange** (DH)
 - Allows two people to securely generate a shared key without anyone else knowing. This key can then be used to communicate using a symmetric cipher.
- Before we can study this algorithm, we need a quick number theory primer.

We want to define a system of arithmetic that is 'closed' on a finite set of numbers. For example, let's use the set $\{0, 1, 2, 3, 4\}$ (first **five** numbers, starting from zero).

- Problem: when we add (or multiply), the numbers get too big.
 - $3 + 4 = 7$ (outside the set)
 - We want to be able to add and multiply anything and never deal with numbers above 4.
- Solution: for numbers outside the set, we 'wrap around' and consider only the **remainder** when divided by 5. This works for both $+$ and \times .
- Remember that when we divide a number by m , the remainder is always between 0 and $m - 1$.

- We say $a \equiv b \pmod{m}$ (a and b are equivalent modulo m) if m divides $(b - a)$.
 - Or equivalently, if the remainder of $a \div m$ is the same as the remainder of $b \div m$.
 - Examples:
 - $10 \equiv 0 \pmod{5}$ because 5 divides $10 - 0$
 - $-12 \equiv 3 \pmod{5}$ because 5 divides $-12 - 3$
- Suppose we want to add $3 + 4$. Normally this would be 7, which is outside our set. But $7 \equiv 2 \pmod{5}$, so we can say

$$3 + 4 \equiv 2 \pmod{5}.$$

You can add and multiply the numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 using this rule, and the answer always stays within this set!

Let's look at the addition table and multiplication table modulo 5:

| + | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 0 |
| 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 1 |
| 3 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 4 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |

| × | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 3 |
| 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 2 |
| 4 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |

- We call m the **modulus**.
- The set of numbers $0, 1, 2, \dots, m - 1$ together with these rules for addition and multiplication is called \mathbb{Z}/m , the **ring of integers modulo m** .
- Modular arithmetic obeys nice algebraic rules, so it's consistent and coherent:
 - If $a \equiv b \pmod{m}$ and $c \equiv d \pmod{m}$, then
 - $ac \equiv bd \pmod{m}$
 - and $a + c \equiv b + d \pmod{m}$

The integers modulo m : examples

- $\mathbb{Z}/14$: (integers modulo 14):
 - $8 + 10 \equiv 4 \pmod{14}$
because $8 + 10 = 18$, and $18 \div 14 = 1$ remainder 4.
 - $5 \times 6 \equiv 2 \pmod{14}$
because $5 \times 6 = 30$, and $30 \div 14 = 2$ remainder 2.
- $\mathbb{Z}/32$: (integers modulo 32)
 - $11 + 30 \equiv 9 \pmod{32}$
 - $10 \times 7 \equiv 6 \pmod{32}$
- $\mathbb{Z}/2147483647$: (integers modulo 2,147,483,647)
 - $235 \times 325284906 \equiv 1280025265$

The integers modulo m : prime modulus

- The number we used in that last example is actually a **prime number**: 2,147,483,647
 - This very useful number is $2^{31} - 1$, the largest number you can store on a computer using 32 bits.
- If p is a prime number, \mathbb{Z}/p has an important property: every number modulo p has an **inverse**
 - For every a in \mathbb{Z}/p , there's some a^{-1} such that $a \times a^{-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$
 - For example, in $\mathbb{Z}/7$, we have $2 \times 4 \equiv 1 \pmod{7}$, so the inverse of 2 is $2^{-1} = 4$.
 - This means you can 'divide' by any number: $a \div b = ab^{-1}$
- But if m is not prime, there will be some numbers in \mathbb{Z}/m that don't have a multiplicative inverse.
 - For example, when $m = 6$, there's no inverse of 2 mod 6.
- For a prime number p , we call \mathbb{Z}/p the **finite field with p elements**, or \mathbb{F}_p . Extremely important in number theory

Since we can multiply things in \mathbb{Z}/m , we can also raise a number to an integer power.

- Computing $3^3 \pmod{7}$:

$$3^3 = 3 \times 3 \times 3 = 27 \equiv 6 \pmod{7}$$

- Computing $4^5 \pmod{100}$:

$$4^5 = 4 \times 4 \times 4 \times 4 \times 4 = 1024 \equiv 24 \pmod{100}$$

Suppose we want to calculate $11^{32} \pmod{81}$.

- Simplest way: find 11^{32} (a 33-digit number), take the remainder modulo 81
- Faster way:
 - Start by calculating $11^2 = 121 \equiv 40 \pmod{81}$
 - Then square that: $11^4 = (11^2)^2 \equiv 40^2 = 1600 \equiv 61 \pmod{81}$
 - Square it again: $11^8 = (11^4)^2 \equiv 61^2 = 3721 \equiv 76 \pmod{81}$
 - Eventually we get $11^{32} \equiv 58 \pmod{81}$
- There's a way to do this for exponents that aren't powers of 2 with only slightly more work. We never have to work with numbers bigger than m^2 .
- So it's very fast and easy for a computer to calculate $b^c \pmod{m}$.

It's easy to compute powers in \mathbb{Z}/m . What about logarithms?

- In \mathbb{R} (real numbers), it's easy to calculate $\log x$ for any $x > 0$.
 - $y = \log x$ is a **continuous** function, so it's easy to find approximate solutions using Newton's method (for example)
 - $\log_2 5 \approx 2.32192809 \dots$
- What if we want to find $\log_b a$ where a and b are integers modulo m ?
 - That is, find an integer c such that $b^c \equiv a \pmod{m}$.
 - Example: in $\mathbb{Z}/31$, $\log_3 10 = 14$ because $3^{14} \equiv 10 \pmod{31}$.
- Is there any way to do it faster than just trying every possible exponent until we find one that works?
- This is called the **discrete logarithm** problem. It's computationally hard, like finding the prime factors of a big number.

The discrete logarithm


Each number in $\mathbb{Z}/31$ appears as 3^c for some c . But there's no easy way to tell **when** a particular value will appear.

| c | $3^c \bmod 31$ |
|-----|----------------|
| 0 | 1 |
| 1 | 3 |
| 2 | 9 |
| 3 | 27 |
| 4 | 19 |
| 5 | 26 |
| 6 | 16 |
| 7 | 17 |
| 8 | 20 |
| 9 | 29 |
| 10 | 25 |

| c | $3^c \bmod 31$ |
|-----|----------------|
| 11 | 13 |
| 12 | 8 |
| 13 | 24 |
| 14 | 10 |
| 15 | 30 |
| 16 | 28 |
| 17 | 22 |
| 18 | 4 |
| 19 | 12 |
| 20 | 5 |
| 21 | 15 |

| c | $3^c \bmod 31$ |
|-----|----------------|
| 22 | 14 |
| 23 | 11 |
| 24 | 2 |
| 25 | 6 |
| 26 | 18 |
| 27 | 23 |
| 28 | 7 |
| 29 | 21 |
| 30 | 1 |
| 31 | 3 |

Kind of like a teleporter maze...



If you keep multiplying by b , eventually you'll hit every integer mod m :

$$b, b^2, b^3, b^4, \dots, b^{m-2}, b^{m-1}$$

But you don't know in what order you'll see these numbers.

Diffie-Hellman key exchange

- Suppose Alice and Bob want to communicate using a **symmetric cryptosystem** like AES.
- In order to do this, they need to share a symmetric key without letting anyone else know it.
- Ideally they should be able to simultaneously create the key without sharing private information over an unsecured channel. This is called **key exchange**.
- **Diffie-Hellman** key exchange uses the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem to keep the key safe from attackers.

Diffie-Hellman key exchange

DH key exchange algorithm:

- Alice and Bob choose a large prime number p and a special number g in \mathbb{Z}/p . These numbers will be shared publicly.
- Alice chooses a random integer a modulo p to be her **private key**. She calculates $A = g^a \pmod p$, which is her **public key**.
- Bob chooses a random integer b modulo p to be his **private key**. He calculates $B = g^b \pmod p$, which is his **public key**.
- Alice and Bob both publish their public keys so everyone can see them. They keep their private keys hidden.

Only Alice knows
 a

Everyone knows
 p, g, A, B

Only Bob knows
 b

Diffie-Hellman key exchange

Only Alice knows

a

Everyone knows

p, g, A, B

Only Bob knows

b

Now it's time to create a shared secret symmetric key.

- Alice calculates $k = B^a \equiv (g^b)^a \equiv g^{ab} \pmod{m}$
- Bob calculates $k = A^b \equiv (g^a)^b \equiv g^{ab} \pmod{m}$
- Now Alice and Bob both know $k = g^{ab}$, which they can use as a shared secret key
- For a third person to compute k , he would have to find either a or b , which are the base- g logarithms of A and B modulo p .

- $p = 29, g = 10$
- Alice chooses $a = 6$ for her private key. She calculates $A = 10^6 \equiv 22 \pmod{29}$ for her public key
- Bob chooses $b = 21$ for his private key. He calculates $B = 10^{21} \equiv 12 \pmod{29}$ for his public key
- Alice computes $k = B^a \equiv 12^6 \equiv 28 \pmod{29}$
- Bob computes $k = A^b \equiv 22^{21} \equiv 28 \pmod{29}$
- The shared secret key is $k = 28$.

Solving the discrete logarithm problem


- In the real world, p is probably a 1024-bit number (about 308 digits!)
- Brute force attack: try all 2^{1024} possibilities.
 - would take many, many years even for a supercomputer
- But there are some clever algorithms which speed things up. . .
 - Pollard rho
 - Baby-step giant-step
 - Pollard Kangaroo
- These algorithms have running time $O(\sqrt{p})$. (Birthday paradox)
 - Better than brute force; equivalent to trying 2^{512} numbers instead of 2^{1024} .
 - Still slow

Discrete log algorithms: index calculus

- There's a much better algorithm to find logarithms in \mathbb{Z}/m called **index calculus**.
 - Uses the fact that many integers modulo m are products of small primes. (smooth numbers)
 - Factor some of these integers, create a system of linear equations based on this
 - Solve the system, use the solution to find the logarithm
 - Much more complicated than Pollard rho, but faster
- The better the algorithms that attack a cryptosystem, the larger the key we need to remain secure.
 - Index calculus is such a strong attack that it would force us to use very big keys (large key space)
 - As an alternative, we can define a cryptosystem using a different type of discrete log that's not vulnerable to index calculus. . .

What is an elliptic curve?

An **elliptic curve** is a curve in \mathbb{R}^2 defined by an equation of the form $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ for some constants a and b .



A **group** is a set of things (like numbers), together with an operation (like addition), such that:

- 1 If you add any two elements of the group, the sum is an element of the group
- 2 The operation is associative, meaning $a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c$
 - Sometimes (but not always) the operation is commutative also: $a + b = b + a$
- 3 There is an **identity element** e . Any element plus the identity is itself
- 4 Every element has an inverse. If you add an element and its inverse, you get the identity: $a + -a = e$.

One example of a group: the set of all integers

$\mathbb{Z} = \{\dots, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, \dots\}$ with addition as the operation.

- for any two integers a and b , $a + b$ is also an integer
- the identity is 0. For any integer a , $a + 0 = a$
- The inverse of a is $-a$. Clearly $a + (-a) = 0$.
- This is an infinite group
- But it's not very interesting

Some other examples:

- The integers modulo m under addition form a group
- The integers modulo m under multiplication form a group, if you take out “bad elements” (like 0) that don't have inverses.
 - When m is prime, we only have to take out 0 because every other number has an inverse.
- Permutation groups: a set of all permutations (rearrangements) of a set of things, with function composition as the group operation
- Symmetry groups of geometric objects

We can define a version of the discrete log problem in any **finite cyclic group**.


Group structure of an elliptic curve

We can create a group using the set of rational points on an elliptic curve, if we choose the appropriate group operation.

- Let G be the set of pairs of rational numbers (x, y) which satisfy $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$.
- We want to define a group on this set. We need:
 - ① an operation $+$ such that for any two elements P, Q in G , $P + Q$ is also in G .
 - must be associative, i.e. $P + (Q + R) = (P + Q) + R$
 - ② an identity element I such that $P + I = P$ for all P in G
 - ③ an inverse $-P$ for each element P , such that $P + -P = I$.
- How do we do this?

Elliptic curve group operation

- To add $P + Q$:
 - Draw the line \overline{PQ}
 - \overline{PQ} intersects the curve at exactly 3 points*
 - Define $P + Q$ to be the reflection across the x -axis of the third intersection point (besides P and Q).
- Easy to prove the following:
 - $P + Q$ is always rational, so $P + Q$ is in G
 - $+$ is associative (and commutative)
- To add $P + P$, draw the tangent to the curve at P



Two questions:

- ① What happens if you add two points with the same x coordinate?
 - \overline{PQ} is a vertical line
 - Only intersects the curve at P and Q – there's no third point!
- ② What is the identity element?
 - We need some point I such that for every point P on the curve, $P + I = P$ and $P + -P = I$.

To answer these questions, we need to **add an extra imaginary point to the curve.**

Let's add one more point to this group: ∞ , the **point at infinity**.


- Think of this as a magical point that exists infinitely far above (and/or below) the curve
- Think of a vertical line \overline{PQ} as passing through three points: P, Q on the curve and ∞ .
- ∞ is the identity element
 - To add $P + \infty$, draw a vertical line through P . The line $\overline{P\infty}$ intersects the curve directly above or below P , so $P + \infty = -(-P) = P$.
- The inverse of P is its reflection across the x-axis, $-P$.
 - The line $\overline{P(-P)}$ intersects the curve at $P, -P$, and ∞ , so $P + -P = \infty$.

Now we have an actual group operation on the elliptic curve! The group of rational points on the curve E is called $E(\mathbb{Q})$.

Elliptic curve group operation: identity and inverse

The identity element is ∞

- $P + \infty = P$
- $P + -P = \infty$
- $Q + \infty = Q$
- $Q + -Q = \infty$



Elliptic curve group operation: formula

Let E be an elliptic curve with equation $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ and let $P(x_1, y_1)$ and $Q(x_2, y_2)$ be points on E with $x_1 \neq x_2$.

- If $P \neq Q$, let $s = \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1}$
- If $P = Q$, let $s = \frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1}$
- Let $x_3 = s^2 - x_1 - x_2$ and let $y_3 = y_1 - s(x_1 - x_3)$
- Then (x_3, y_3) is the third intersection point of E and \overline{PQ}
- Therefore $P + Q = (x_3, -y_3)$.

So you don't have to actually draw lines on a graph to add points. You can just use this formula.

For cryptography, we need to work in a finite set, not all the rational numbers

- Consider the integer pairs (x, y) with $0 \leq x, y < p$ which satisfy the equation $y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$
- Example: $y^2 \equiv x^3 + x + 6 \pmod{7}$
 - $(4, 2)$ is a solution because $2^2 \equiv 4^3 + 4 + 6 \equiv 4 \pmod{7}$
- The group operation still works. (Use the formula from the previous slide)
- The group of points on E modulo p is called $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$.
 - This is a **finite cyclic group**
 - Hasse's theorem: there are (roughly) p points on the curve modulo p .

The Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem

- If you have a number n and a point P on the curve, it's easy to add P to itself n times and find the point nP
- But, if you have P and an arbitrary point Q , how do you find a number n such that P added to itself n times is Q ?
 - If you keep adding P you'll eventually hit every point on the curve, but in an unpredictable order.
- This is the same thing as the discrete log problem, but in a different group: $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ instead of $(\mathbb{Z}/p)^\times$.
 - Takes a long time to solve, even with computers
- **ECDHE** is a version of Diffie-Helman that uses the elliptic curve version of the discrete logarithm problem.

Alice and Bob want to securely generate a shared secret key

- They agree on an elliptic curve E , a prime p , and a point P on E . These things are all shared publicly.
- Alice chooses a random positive integer a to be her private key. She adds P to itself a times to get a point $A = aP$ on E . This is her public key.
- Bob chooses a random positive integer b to be his private key. He adds P to itself b times to get a point $B = bP$ on E . This is his public key.
- Alice and Bob publish their public keys, but keep their private keys secret.

- Alice adds B to itself a times, getting $k = a(bP) = (ab)P$.
- Bob adds A to itself b times, getting $k = b(aP) = (ab)P$.
- Now Alice and Bob both know $k = (ab)P$, which they can use as a shared secret key.
- For a third person to find k , they would have to compute a or b , i.e. the discrete log of A or B in $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$.

- Some discrete log algorithms work in any group, including $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$: Pollard rho, Kangaroo, etc
- But index calculus does NOT work!
 - the elliptic curve group is too 'strange'. Index calculus relies on using information about \mathbb{Z} (prime factorization)
- So the best known attacks are of the Rho/Kangaroo/BSGS type, which are much slower
- Same security level with much smaller keys!


However. . .

- Like any cryptosystem, someone may discover a new, much better method of attack
- Particular elliptic curves may have hidden weaknesses
 - Some people don't trust NIST standards for this reason (NSA backdoor?)
 - Both number theorists and terrifyingly Orwellian government agencies are VERY interested in studying elliptic curves.
- Quantum computing / Shor's algorithm

Nevertheless, ECC has become an extremely popular public-key paradigm in the last 2 decades.

ECDHE in online communication protocols

TLS, HTTPS



ECDSA (digital signature algorithm) is used in:

Bitcoin (blockchain)



iMessage



PS3 (oops)



Android



- Public-key cryptography allows people to communicate securely without sharing the same key
- Public-key algorithms are based on hard (usually number-theoretic) mathematical problems
- The discrete logarithm problem is used in cryptosystems such as Diffie-Hellman
- Elliptic curve cryptography uses discrete logarithms in an elliptic curve group $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ to provide even better security

Further reading:

- *The Code Book* by Simon Singh
 - Non-technical history of cryptography from antiquity to the present day
- *Understanding Cryptography* by C. Paar, J. Pelzl
 - Excellent textbook on modern crypto algorithms. Written for engineers, explains all the required math.
- Bruce Schneier's blog: schneier.com